In recent years, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been the focus for many complaints involving environmentally-based trade disputes between countries. As a result, there has been increasing pressure for the WTO to explicitly address environmental issues in its governance of barriers to international trade. In this paper, we examine the main areas of conflict between WTO provisions and sustainable management of the environment. In particular, we highlight potential impacts, both negative and positive, of trade liberalisation and WTO principles for environmental sustainability. Finally, we discuss measures for resolving the trade-environment controversy.
Introduction
In recent years, environmental issues have increasingly become focal points for international trade disputes. The World Trade Organization (WTO), formed in 1995 as an organisation designed to facilitate international economic relations, has been at the centre of these disputes. The decisions made by the WTO in many of these disputes have convinced many environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and others in civil society that the WTO systematically works against the interests of the environment. The level of dissatisfaction that these groups have with the WTO was highlighted through demonstrations and protests during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in November 1999. There is now a common expectation amongst many members of civil society that the WTO should explicitly address social and environmental issues when designing and administering the rules of international trade. The stated objective of the WTO, however, has always been narrowly defined to provide a stable environment for businesses to conduct international transactions, and as such the WTO has been reluctant to become involved in social and environmental issues.
While the recent Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has given a higher profile to environmental issues in WTO negotiations, the member countries of the WTO have generally not been able to agree on whether it would be appropriate to widen the organisation's mandate, or how environmental issues could be incorporated. As a result, while the WTO can discuss environmental issues and consult with environmental NGOs and other interested parties, it can only administer what has been previously agreed by its members. Therefore, there are aspects of international trade law that conflict with good environmental management practices.
The following section of this paper will discuss the economic context of trade and the environment focusing on some of the basic economic models used to describe the relationship between economic development and environmental quality. The focus of the next sections will be the potential areas of conflict between sustainable environmental management and trade in general, and more specifically the WTO. The role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) in trade and environment conflicts is then briefly discussed. Finally, the paper provides some suggestions for addressing or removing the conflict.
Economic context for trade and environment
The impact of economic activity on the environment has received much attention, particularly in the last quarter of the 20th century. The development of the resource and environmental economics disciplines has been driven by concern over the ability of traditional economic models to incorporate the environmental costs associated with the allocation of scarce resources. While the majority of the resource/environmental economics literature has not explicitly evaluated the impact of liberalised trade policies on environmental systems, the insight into the causes of environmental degradation provided by this work is important.
Market failures are situations where the market forces of supply and demand do not allocate resources in a way that is socially optimal. A simple economic model can be used to depict a market failure associated with, for example, allocating land to wildlife habitat or intensive agriculture ( Figure 1 ). For demonstration purposes, it is assumed that only these two land uses are possible. The optimal allocation of land is given by the point where the marginal benefit (demand) just covers the marginal cost of production (including the cost of land conversion). In this model, the private optimum will also be optimal for society if all costs are captured, including the costs of decreased wildlife habitat, biodiversity and environmental services. However, the public good characteristics of these environmental goods and services result in these costs not being captured by the farmer, as represented by the divergence between private and social marginal costs (Figure 1 ). The failure of the market to capture the environmental costs of land conversion results in more land allocated to intensive agriculture and, therefore, less land allocated to habitat than is socially optimal. A wide range of environmental problems including pollution, and water and land allocation can be described using similar models.
Figure 1
Note: Market failure expressed as the divergence between the social and private marginal cost and the social and private optimum quantity of land allocated to intensive agriculture and wildlife habitat.
Source: Belcher and others
Market failures are an important cause of environmental damage associated with economic activity. In some cases, international trade can exacerbate market failures. For example, an export opportunity that arises from removing trade barriers can be seen as an increase in demand in the market depicted in Figure 1 . This will amplify the scale of the environmental damage. However, the reason for the increased environmental damage is not trade, as such, but the failure of the market to effectively capture the social costs of the activity. As a result, "… members of the trade community may well argue that environmental degradation associated with trade liberalisation is not bad trade policy, but bad environmental management. If market prices do not reflect the cost to society of damage to the environment, then these costs should have been internalised through effective environmental management." [1] The development of effective environmental policies aimed at 'internalising' the environmental costs would be an important step to improving environmental management and removing conflicts between trade and the environment. An important component in the argument for freer trade is the potential relationship between per capita income and environmental degradation. In general, it is argued that if poverty is the core of the problem, economic growth will be part of the solution in that as income increases, social preferences will change with greater demands by society for higher environmental quality. This relationship is described by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Figure 2 ). The EKC has been used to justify an increase in trade involving developing countries, which lie on the upward sloping portion of the curve, based on the potentially positive environmental impacts.
Figure 2 The environmental Kuznets curve

Source: Belcher and others
While there is some evidence to support the EKC, there is also evidence to suggest that this relationship cannot be taken for granted. In general, for the relationship to hold, the changes in preferences that are facilitated by increased income must be reflected in changes in environmental policy. It has been shown that growth itself often increases environmental impacts, thereby requiring additional environmental protection policies to simply maintain environmental quality, let alone improve it [2] . Another important consideration is that the EKC depends on the capability of the system to repair the environmental damage, and thereby provide the downward sloping segment of the relationship. In situations where there is irreversible damage to the environment (i.e. species extinction, changes in ecological function), subsequent environmental improvement is no longer possible [2] . Further, it has been shown that countries are more prone to respond to environmental issues that have local impacts (i.e. local pollutants, consumptive use of wildlife) than those with global effects (i.e. greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss) [3] .
The institutional and system requirements for the EKC to be valid suggests that faith in the paradigm that follows a stylised progression such as -trade liberalisation leads to economic growth; economic growth leads to higher incomes; higher incomes lead to greater value being placed on the environment; a society that values the environment more highly will put policies in place to better protect the environment -is not justified. In a similar fashion, however, to suggest that preventing trade, and thereby slowing economic growth, somehow provides a solution to problems associated with environmental degradation is also a non sequitur. Slower economic growth combined with expanding population may lead to ever increasing pressure on the environment without the favourable change in attitude toward stronger environmental policies. The root of the problem is not trade, but rather that the income available to people in developing countries at a particular point in time is not sufficient for them to give due consideration to the future state of their environment (i.e. they may be making rational choices given their constraints). This is a problem that transcends any debate regarding the desirability of trade.
The presence of market failures, and the related uncertainty concerning the validity of the EKC, reveals that more liberalised trade may not be associated with increasing, or non-decreasing, environmental quality. In this context, economic development must be encouraged with an explicit consideration of the environmental consequences in order to be environmentally sustainable. Corden [4] states, 'Theory does not say that 'free trade is best'. It says that, given certain assumptions, it is 'best'.' A critical component of such assumptions is that there is a smooth functioning price mechanism ensuring that all costs and benefits are adequately represented in the market. The following section of the paper will focus on issues of how components of the WTO may address or incorporate these costs and benefits.
The World Trade Organization
'The Marrakesh Agreement' established the WTO in January 1995 [5] . The objectives of the WTO, as stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, are to facilitate trade with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and expanding the production of, and trade in goods and services, while embracing the principles of sustainable development as defined by the Brundtland commission [6, 7] . The WTO incorporates the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 which in turn incorporates GATT 1947, which was negotiated in 1947 when the environmental consequences of economic integration were not a primary concern. Only indirect references to the environment were included in the exception clause in Article XX, which will be discussed later. Hence, the underlying structure of the WTO was built to achieve one fundamental goal − providing a set of rules by which national governments regulate international economic transactions.
As a result, although the importance of protecting the environment is clearly stated in the Marrakesh Agreement it was certainly not the main focus of negotiations, the WTO has not been well designed to adjudicate issues relating to international development, labour standards and sustainable development [8] and has avoided involvement in such issues [9] . However, with the human population increasing from 2.5 to over 6 billion in the last 50 years, and an even larger increase in the scale of the global economy, environmental issues are becoming increasingly tied to economic development, including trade.
General areas of conflict between trade and environment
In general, the impact of trade on the environment has been decomposed into three interacting elements:
1 composition effect -increased specialisation of the economy in response to trade opportunities will be environmentally improving (degrading) if the expanding industry is less (more) environmentally damaging 2 scale effect -increased scale of production in response to trade results in greater usage of resources and increased waste emissions 3 technique effect -as dictated by the EKC, income growth that results from the scale effect drives an increase in demand for environmental improvement which, if responded to with appropriate policy, results in an improved environment [10] . The net environmental impact of these effects is largely ambiguous. However, the prevalence of market failures, resulting from the public good characteristics of environmental goods and services, suggests that without an appropriate policy response to facilitate the technique effect, there may be net negative impacts of trade associated with the composition and scale effects.
Specific areas of conflict within the structure of the WTO
GATT 1994
The WTO was conceived as a result of the shortcomings of the GATT that were becoming increasingly apparent as the global economy evolved over the latter half of the 20 th century. The GATT was a temporary agreement originally negotiated in 1947 that dealt only with trade in goods. Over time, services have become the fastest growing sectors of national economies. In addition, the proportion of the value of goods comprised of intellectual property is rising rapidly. Instead of attempting to reform the GATT, it was decided during the Uruguay Round of negotiations to form a new organisation. The WTO is a permanent organisation that administers a number of agreements including the existing GATT, and the new agreements negotiated at the Uruguay Round including the GATS and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). The original GATT 1947 is no longer in force, however GATT 1994, which is legally distinct from GATT 1947, sets out the main WTO rules that bear specifically on trade in goods and includes, without change, many key elements from GATT 1947. As a result, the GATT as an organisation has ceased to exist but the GATT agreement still exists.
The WTO rests upon the four fundamental principles of free trade:
1 Trade without discrimination -GATT signatories must not discriminate between trading partners through the granting of most favoured nation status ((MFN) GATT Article I) to all partners. GATT signatories must treat 'like' products or services of all members as favourably as it treats its own domestic products or services (national treatment, GATT Article III).
2 Freer and fair trade -GATT signatories must lower trade barriers including quantitative import or export restrictions (quotas or bans), and duties and tariffs that may be used to restrict the movement of goods across their borders. In addition, the WTO provides a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition including MFN, national treatment, and prohibition of dumping and export subsidies.
3 Transparency -members must publish all measures that affect the operation of the agreement and notify all other members of any general laws and regulations on WTO matters. In part these measures are to ensure that trading partners are confident that trade barriers (including tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures) will not be raised arbitrarily.
4 Reciprocity -during rounds of negotiations, for example the reduction of tariffs, each country will make equivalent tariff concessions. It should be noted that no provision in GATT provides guidance on how reciprocity is to be established, and it has been left to each government to determine for itself the economic benefits and advantages of the exchange of concessions [11] . The WTO continues to work to eliminate all barriers (tariff and non-tariff) to international trade.
The GATT allows member countries to adopt measures that are inconsistent with the above Articles under Article XX, which provides a list of general exceptions. Article XX may be applied to justify environmentally-inspired rules that conflict with free trade [12] . Several clauses are of particular interest in examining potential trade-environment conflicts; Article XX (b) allows countries to pursue measures deemed 'necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health' and Article XX (g) permits measures 'relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources'. The chapeau to this article specifies limits, the extent to which such measures can be applied, stating that measures must not result in unjustified or arbitrary discrimination, or be a disguised restriction on international trade. It is through this article that most countries facing a GATT, and subsequently WTO, dispute on environmental issues have attempted to defend their trade-restricting measures. Despite the potential role of Article XX in environmental disputes, there is significant confusion concerning the interpretation and uncertainty in the application of its specific terms. Several commentators have evaluated the range of interpretations of the phrases 'necessary' and 'relating to' in the context of particular environmental disputes. In the case of XX (b), it is the job of WTO dispute settlement panel to determine whether:
• the substance of the measure is the protection of human, animal or plant life or health
• the measure is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
• the measure is applied consistently with the chapeau [12] .
With respect to Article XX (g), the panel must decide whether:
• the measure falls within the range of policies relating to conservation of exhaustible natural resources
• the measure itself is related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
• the measure is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption
• the measure is applied in conformity with the chapeau. It appears that the primary motivation of this Article is whether the trade measure is a disguised protectionist barrier to trade and not the efficacy of the measure with respect to environmental protection This is consistent with the trade policy orientation of the GATT.
It may be the case that although the terms of clauses XX (b) and XX (g) are easy to satisfy, countries are constrained in their use of trade measures by the strict terms of the chapeau [13] . Indeed, 'no country in the GATT fifty-year history has been able to successfully invoke Article XX for the protection of a trade measure' [14] . In fact, the decisions with respect to two recent trade disputes involving Article XX: US vs. Mexico, EU and Netherlands in the dolphin-tuna cases in 1991 and 1994 [15] , and US vs. India, Pakistan and Thailand in the sea turtle-shrimp case in 1998 (WTO case Nos. 58 and 61) [16] , concerned challenges to import restrictions imposed by the USA in response to what were deemed by the USA as unacceptable fishing methods used by the other countries. From the perspective of the WTO dispute settlement body, it is often difficult to determine whether trade measures are environmentally justified or whether they are a disguised restriction to international trade. As the WTO's primary purpose is to protect those wishing to engage in international economic transactions from government's capricious use of trade barriers for protectionist purposes, it is probably not surprising that its deliberations focus on this aspect of the argument rather than wider environmental issues. In the above-mentioned cases the WTO ruled narrowly that, under its existing GATT commitments, the USA could not use trade sanctions to enforce its own marine mammal protection laws outside its jurisdiction. The adjudication panel accepted the conservation objective of the US policies but had no interest in other aspects of USA marine mammal legislation. In a subsequent ruling the GATT panel ruled that the US boycott was illegal because the GATT does not allow trade bans based on production methods. These decisions, made within the narrow GATT mandate, have often been interpreted by environmental NGOs as evidence of loss of local control to 'environmentally irresponsible international organisations'. However, the WTO can only administer the rules that governments have previously agreed to within the trade agreement and these rules can only be altered through negotiation involving the member governments.
WTO provisions
As concerns over the protection of public health and the environment have increased, so has the development and implementation of mandatory regulations and voluntary standards for processes or products that could affect either health or the environment. When these standards differ between countries, they have the potential to impede trade. Concern over the implications of standards for international trade has stimulated the development of a range of WTO agreements. Of particular relevance to environmental considerations are the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements. The SPS Agreement applies to measures to protect humans, animals and plants from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food substances as well as from the spread of disease by pests, animals or plants. While the agreement recognises WTO Members' rights to take measures that may restrict trade, these steps must be equivalently applied to local and foreign products (in accordance with the MFN principle [17]) for the sole purpose of ensuring food safety and animal and plant health, and the measures must be scientifically justified. The primary source of controversy in this agreement centres around the difficulty of developing sufficient scientific proof when evaluating the impacts on complex environmental systems. The concern is that the agreement will facilitate the exploitation of any scientific uncertainty surrounding a protective law as a reason to limit preventative environmental action [18] .
It has been argued that the SPS Agreement's requirements for scientific proof are in direct conflict with the spirit of the precautionary principle as set forth in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, agreed to at the Earth Summit in 1992. In this regard, the Rio Declaration states that: 'Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation'.
In essence, the SPS Agreement imposes a burden of proof such that additives, contaminants and toxins must be proved harmful, whereas the precautionary principle, as set forth in the Rio Declaration, requires that the element must be proved to be benign. These issues proved to be central in the WTO decision on Europe's ban on hormonetreated meat (WTO case Nos. 26 and 48). The WTO rejected the EU's argument due to a lack of scientific evidence of a health and safety risk [19] . In addition, it was stated that the specific wording of the SPS Agreement prevailed over the precautionary principle. However, the panel concluded that 'the precautionary principle awaits confirmation as a customary principle of international law' [1] .
It is worthwhile to note that the SPS agreement can be considered precautionary in spirit since it allows countries to put trade barriers in place when scientific information is insufficient to reach a scientific judgement [20] . It is expected that these restrictions, however, will be temporary until sufficient information becomes available. There is also an obligation on the country imposing the trade barrier to make every effort to acquire sufficient information to reach a scientific conclusion. It seems clear that these SPS provisions were written to deal with relatively simple scientific questions such as shortrun food safety and not long term or scientifically intractable questions relating to complex environmental systems. The WTO claims that such questions are beyond its competence and require separate international agreements to deal with them. Thus it is not fair to condemn the WTO for not applying the precautionary principle when its Members have not sanctioned it. There is nothing to prevent the inclusion of the precautionary principle in relevant WTO agreements through future negotiations.
The TBT Agreement establishes obligations to ensure that voluntary standards, mandatory regulations and conformity assessment procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied with the view or effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade [21] . As with the SPS Agreement, technical regulations pertaining to mechanisms such as labelling, testing and certification procedures must adhere to the obligations pursuant to the MFN principle [17] . At present, there have been no disputes raised concerning the obligations of the TBT Agreement. However, WTO dispute panels have ruled that the GATT 1994 does not allow trade bans based on production methods in the two high-profile cases involving the incidental catching and killing of dolphins during tuna harvests and sea turtles during shrimp harvests. However, a 1991 GATT panel ruled in favour of the US 'dolphin-friendly tuna' label over Mexican objections that such a labelling requirement constituted a non-tariff trade barrier. There is little doubt that the TBT Agreement will become increasingly important in future disputes between WTO Members as disagreement over the legitimacy of certain technical regulations and standards widen [1] . The reason production processes are not allowed as justifications for imposing barriers to trade is to prevent industrial protectionist interests that, for example, use modern technology to produce textiles, from lobbying their governments for trade barriers on cloth produced using labour-intensive hand looms in developing countries. This was agreed long before issues such as tuna fishing methods (a production process) were thought of as problems. Developing countries can be expected to resist any inclusion of production processes as a justification for limiting trade as they perceive this as a 'slippery slope' for protectionist measures against their products.
It is anticipated that the primary source of conflict surrounding the TBT Agreement is the lack of consensus as to its coverage of standards and regulations relating to the processes and methods that produced the product, unless the method of production is evident in the product itself [1] . In terms of the environmental impact, the processes and methods that produced the traded products can be of critical importance. Von Moltke [22] states that trade can contribute to sustainability only if it is possible to distinguish between products produced using sustainable and unsustainable production practices. Eco-labelling schemes provide consumers with information about how goods have been produced to help them discern between products that incorporate environmentally destructive and environmentally benign production practices.
Even if it is decided that labelling of products for environmental purposes is covered by the disciplines of the TBT Agreement, there is uncertainty about whether processbased eco-labelling schemes are legal under the WTO. In general, both the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement prohibit discrimination between 'like' products (e.g., cotton cloth produced on high-tech or hand-looms). The question of interpretation is whether likeness extends to production methods and processes. In the agriculture context, the competitiveness of agricultural commodities that are produced using environmentally friendly practices may depend on the interpretation concerning labelling. The first hints of this controversy have shown up in the conflict between the EU and the USA and Canada over the labelling of genetically modified (GM) food products that has recently been raised before the TBT Committee [23] .
Beyond the traditional concerns of developing countries regarding production processes being a means for unjustified protectionism, it is also worthwhile to note that developing countries have been particularly concerned about, and critical of, proposals to allow trade restrictions on the basis of environmentally-unfriendly production practices. They fear that allowing the imposition of trade barriers based on differing environmental standards underlying production processes is simply a new means by which developed countries can extend disguised protection to their industries. Developing countries are suspicious because they find their access to developed countries' markets blocked despite WTO agreements to liberalise. If trade barriers are allowed on the basis of the environmental friendliness of the processes used in production, those trade measures still provide domestic industries with protection from foreign competition. Developing countries fear that playing the environmental card will become a far too convenient method for developed countries to respond to traditional protectionist pressures. Future negotiations over this issue are likely to be particularly acrimonious and developed countries' attempts to have the issue (along with labour standards) put on the negotiating agenda was one of the major reasons for the failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle.
The WTO and subsidies
Subsidies have been an extremely important component of domestic and international agricultural, resource and environmental policies. The WTO rules pertaining to subsidies are largely contained in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, signed in 1994 at the Uruguay Round. The SCM Agreement allows subsidies that are non-recurring and limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law [24] . Subsidies that do not meet the criteria set out in this agreement are determined to be either actionable or prohibited. Therefore, the extent to which a member can subsidise domestic production is limited under these rules, especially since other members can challenge the use of a subsidy if they feel it undermines their access to that market [25] .
The Agreement on Agriculture, also signed at the Uruguay Round, designated 'allowable' (often called 'Green Box') measures that permit some specified subsidies to be paid to domestic producers. Under this exception, the subsidies should have no, or minimal, trade-distorting effects and be designated under an environmental program [26] . Specifically, the Agreement states that payments should be made under a specified government environmental or conservation program, and are limited to covering the extra costs or loss of income associated with program compliance. As an example, the US government has argued that Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) payments are permitted under the criteria for a 'Green Box' measure. Subsidies that target such environmental issues as species conservation could be challenged under the WTO if the disputing country can provide evidence that the subsidy is an arbitrary and unjustified barrier to trade. Further, future challenges to domestic subsidies are likely to be forthcoming with the Agreement on Agriculture currently being re-negotiated by WTO Members. Recently, some members (EU, Korea, Japan, Norway) have suggested broadening the scope of the Green Box, while the major agricultural exporters continue to stress that environmental and social objectives should be met through means other than subsidies [27] .
Multilateral environmental agreements
In addition to working together to establish rules for the conduct of international trade, countries have also been actively seeking cooperative means of dealing with global environmental problems. Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) have been established in a number of areas including biodiversity (The Convention on Biological Diversity), endangered species (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)) and climate change (Kyoto Protocol). Approximately twenty of these MEAs contain clauses directly affecting trade, and many of these provisions are inconsistent with the rules of the WTO. An important question in this context is, if an environmental measure implemented by a country in accordance with its MEA obligation violates provisions of the WTO, which agreement would take precedence?
The potential for conflict between MEAs and WTO rules is most acute when there is dissimilar membership in the two international agreements. For example, a country that is not a member of a specific MEA may object to the trade limiting provisions of the MEA under the auspices of the WTO since they have not voluntarily agreed to such trade measures. In such cases, the WTO would provide the only possible mechanism for settling the dispute. In general, present MEAs have no dispute settlement system and no coercive ability beyond moral suasion, while the dispute resolution capacity of the WTO is considerable. At Doha it was agreed that clarification of the relationship between MEAs and WTO Agreements would be sought during the new round of negotiations. However, it seems evident that under the current relationship, conflicts that emerge between MEAs and WTO Agreements will likely be decided on the basis of WTO rules on trade [28] . In fact, as discussed earlier, the WTO decision on the EU barriers to beef produced using growth hormones has been perceived as being in conflict with the precautionary principle as specified by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
It should be remembered that both MEAs and the WTO simply reflect what countries have agreed that they can do. For example, there is nothing to prevent those negotiating an MEA from agreeing that it should take precedence over WTO rules when there is a conflict. Countries have simply failed to agree to do so. In some cases, such as the recent Biosafety Protocol, the final agreement leaves the question of precedence hopelessly muddled [29] .
The WTO understands that it is not an environmental policymaking institution; it does not have the expertise, nor does it want to be involved in making policy aimed at environmental problems. The WTO's Committee of Trade and Environment (CTE), established in 1994, believes that trade measures used for environmental management are not an optimal solution, and has stated that MEAs are the best way to coordinate policy action to tackle global and trans-boundary environmental problems cooperatively. The WTO has stated that: 'We agree that environmental considerations should be taken fully into account in the upcoming round of WTO negotiations. This should include a clarification of the relationship between both multilateral and environmental agreements and key environmental principles, and WTO rules' [30] . Until member countries of the MEAs or the WTO are willing to contribute to this clarification, the potential for conflict remains. The directive from DDA indicates that this clarification is a priority in the near future. This paints a picture of the WTO which is a far cry from the power hungry organisation seeking to capture the environmental agenda as it is often portrayed by NGOs.
The way forward
In general, the effects of market failures that are exacerbated by trade liberalisation are often accompanied by an absence of domestic policies and practices that attempt to adequately reflect the value of the natural system [31] . In other words, in the absence of appropriate domestic policy to adequately value environmental goods and services (i.e. wildlife habitat, biodiversity, environmental function) the extant market failure is simply amplified by the scale and composition effects of trade liberalisation. In order to address the market failure, however, the design of policies is of vital importance; Conway [32] states, 'a government's environmental policies are an important but entirely insufficient response to the needs of biodiversity conservation. Social and economic development policies often have a much greater influence on biodiversity stresses'. Therefore, within the agricultural landscape, land use policies will undoubtedly be required to address these environmental conservation and preservation concerns.
The development of domestic policy to address the inherent market failures that occur when dealing with non-market and public goods, such as wildlife habitat, seems to be a well-accepted response to the indirect effects of trade liberalisation. It is, however, likely that there will be some resistance to such policies within an industry if it is perceived that the policies will compromise their competitiveness in the global market. As a result, there may be an unwillingness to develop environmental or development policies aimed at addressing the market failure. In fact, there is often pressure to create domestic policies that encourage trade-intensive sectors and to not develop policies that may adversely affect the competitiveness of an industry [31] . It should be noted that a body of research indicates that stiffer environmental regulations do not necessarily undermine competitiveness [32] . While environmental regulations may impose additional costs on certain sectors, society as a whole benefits if environmental policies are well designed and reflect social preferences. Furthermore, over the long run, environmental policies can stimulate technological change and even enhance competitiveness [33] .
While the indirect impact of trade liberalisation on the environment is an important effect, it is also worthwhile to examine the direct influence of trade rules on policy development. The trade literature indicates that, for example, trade rules provide for environmental improvements in agriculture by removing trade-distorting policies. These policies, by distorting the marginal cost of specific production practices, are another form of market failure. Agriculture subsidies have led to intensified land use, increased applications of agrochemicals, adoption of intensive animal production practices and overgrazing, degradation of natural resources, loss of natural wildlife habitats and biodiversity, reduced agricultural diversity, and expansion of agricultural production into marginal and ecologically sensitive areas [34] .
There has been increasing discussion lately about how to remedy some of the conflicts between WTO rules and environmental sustainability. It has been suggested that amendments be made to the WTO including changes to Article XX to either expand the Article or amend existing provisions to include specific exemptions for environmental trade measures [35] . However, such amendments and/or changes will involve tortuous negotiations between members with divergent ideas and differing agendas, making this an unpopular option.
Another option, as discussed earlier, is to clarify the relationship between the WTO and MEAs. A proposal put forward by Switzerland states that the relationship between WTO and MEAs should be characterised by mutual supportiveness, with each agreement focusing on its primary area of competence. This suggests that while the WTO should not be allowed to determine the legitimacy or necessity of trade-related environmental measures, it should be able to assess whether specific measures are a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries, or a disguised restriction on international trade [36] . The proposal draws attention to the fact that the problem is too fundamental to be resolved on a case-by-case basis by WTO judicial bodies. Another proposal is to enhance the power of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in order to match the status of the WTO [37] . While UNEP is the only global institution responsible for coordinating and monitoring the various MEAs, it lacks enforcement capabilities. With an enhancement of its powers, UNEP could work with the WTO to resolve tradeenvironment problems more effectively. It should be noted that the only reason MEAs do not have more powers of enforcement is that their member governments have not chosen to give them those powers.
In order to make MEAs more effective tools when these agreements are negotiated to include trade provisions, the policymakers designing MEA trade provisions should be required to consult with the WTO to limit conflicts with WTO principles. In recent years, the WTO has taken a proactive role in briefing those responsible for administering MEAs on WTO principles and conventions in an attempt to reduce potential problems. Often those charged with devising domestic environmental policy are poorly informed regarding their country's WTO obligations. In many cases, one suspects that conflicts arising from the design of domestic environmental policies could be reduced if environmental officials were better informed regarding the WTO, and if those responsible for trade policy and environmental policy were encouraged to cooperate to a greater degree.
Finally, it appears that the efforts of NGOs and others over the last few years have, to a large extent, been mis-directed. The WTO is often pilloried by environmental NGOs and is the subject of (sometimes violent) protests. While attacking the WTO has undoubted media value in raising awareness, it is the wrong target. The WTO can only do what national governments have allowed it to do. Only national governments can bring about change. Of course, having a convenient international 'whipping boy' has not been lost on domestic decision makers who are happy to have attention diverted away from them. Strong pressure on domestic policy makers may be a more effective way to alter the WTO to better take account of the environment, to establish the primacy of MEAs, and resolve conflicts between MEAs and the WTO. Refocusing efforts on the actual decision makers, national governments, is the only way real progress can be made in clarifying the relationship between the goals of environmental sustainability and trade liberalisation.
Conclusion
Trade liberalisation can lead to increased stress on the environment where there is a domestic policy failure to protect the environment. Preventing trade liberalisation, however, cannot remove the underlying market failure that causes the environment to be undervalued. Further, trade liberalisation and the economic growth it brings does not necessarily lead to improvement in environmental management as envisioned in the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Inhibiting international trade, however, will not lead to increased environmental sustainability where population growth puts pressure on limited resources. Thus, there is no inherent conflict between the trade liberalising mandate of the WTO and improving environmental management.
The rules of international trade administered by the WTO, however, may make the initiation of domestic policy measures relating to improved environmental management more difficult. The primary reason for this is that the GATT, now administered by the WTO, was negotiated when the environment was not a major policy issue. Further, the WTO's primary concern is not the promotion of environmental sustainability but rather to limit the ability of governments to respond to domestic industries seeking protection. Conflicts between trade rules and environmental management occur because the existing rules of trade focus on the prevention of circumvention and not on improving sustainability. The existing focus should be the primary concern of the WTO whose mandate is to administer agreed rules on trade. Thus, while some aspects of the WTO rules could be improved from the perspective of environmental management, environmental concerns are probably best left to MEA's.
The relationship between the WTO and MEAs needs to be clarified including the issue of precedence in case of conflicts. All of this can be accomplished through international negotiations. The major difficulty is not the WTO, which only administers the rules that have been agreed by its Members, but rather with the unwillingness of governments to endow MEAs with the means to supersede the WTO. Thus, efforts to improve the interface between international trade rules and improved environmental management should focus on national governments.
